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THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAX
EXEMPTION STANDARDS ON HEALTH
CARE POLICY AND DELIVERY
Douglas M Mancinot
One of the accepted legal definitions of "charitable" for purposes
of § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is the promotion of health
for the benefit of the community. One of the best and perhaps the
most widely accepted formulation of the charitable purpose of promo-
tion of health is found in Revenue Ruling 69-545:1
The promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the ad-
vancement of education and religion, is one of the purposes in
the general law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the
community as a whole, even though the class of beneficiaries
eligible to receive a direct benefit from its activities does not
include all members of the community, such as indigent
members of the community, provided that the class is not so
small that its relief is not of benefit to the community.2
This is the standard of exemption that applies to hospitals, health
maintenance organizations, medical groups, home health agencies,
and a wide range of other types of health care organizations that desire
to qualify for exemption from federal income taxation under § 501(a)
of the Code as organizations described in § 501(c)(3) of the Code.3 In
addition, this standard of exemption has been applied by the courts as
well as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to a wide range of other
types of activities including activities undertaken through partnerships
and limited liability companies that have been formed by tax-exempt
health care organizations and proprietary firms or individuals.
Revenue Ruling 69-545 has withstood legal challenges and con-
tinues to reflect the legal standard applicable for determining the tax-
exempt status of health care organizations, and the promotion of
t Partner, McDermott Will & Emery LLP (Los Angeles Office); author of
TAXATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS (2000); co-author of
TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2002).
1 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
2 Id.
3 I.R.C. §§ 50 1(a), (c)(3) (2000).
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health rationale continues to serve as a meaningful and relevant stan-
dard for granting exemption. However, in recent years, Revenue Rul-
ing 69-545 and the legal conclusions to be drawn from its two fact
situations have spawned considerable discussion about what it takes to
satisfy the promotion of health for the benefit of the community stan-
dard so as to obtain "charitable" exemption under § 501(c)(3). 4 Much
of this discussion is centered on the question of whether, and if so, to
what extent, an organization claiming exemption because it promotes
health for the benefit of the community must provide free or below
cost services to the poor or medically underserved. In addition, the
IRS has made it clear through its published positions as well as in its
litigating positions that it is uncomfortable with the potential scope of
the promotion of health for the benefit of the community rationale in
the absence of an express commitment to provide free or below-cost
services to the indigent.5
This article reviews the development of the standards of exemp-
tion applicable to nonprofit hospitals that have, in turn, been applied
to other types of health care organizations such as health maintenance
organizations (HMOs). It then discusses how the seemingly straight-
forward principles set forth in Revenue Ruling 69-545 have been in-
terpreted by the IRS and the courts in a manner that directly or indi-
rectly has impacted the shaping of health care policy and the methods
of delivery of health care.
I. THE CHANGING HEALTH ENVIRONMENT
Revenue Ruling 69-545 was published in 1969, more than thirty-
five years ago, when the health care delivery and financing systems in
the United States were much simpler and considerably different from
today.
In the first place, patient care provided in the nation's nonprofit
hospitals in 1969 was predominantly provided on an inpatient basis.
The health care delivery system would not see the dramatic shift from
inpatient to outpatient modes of delivering health care until the late
1970s and early 1980s when, for example, the number of surgical
procedures that could be performed in an outpatient or ambulatory
care environment dramatically increased as the types of technology
and other aspects of outpatient surgery, such as anesthesia, changed.
In 1969, patient care was considerably less technology-driven than it
4 See infra pp. 14-15.
5 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Field Service Advice, FSA 200110030
at 2, 4 (Feb. 5, 2001) (explaining how the organization must narrow its activities to
adhere to the operational test under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3)).
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is today. Although noninvasive diagnostic imaging procedures such
as computerized tomography scanning and magnetic resonance imag-
ing are taken for granted today, in 2005, those technologies did not
exist in 1969 and would not exist until a decade or more later.
Similarly, in 1969, the notion of competition among nonprofit
hospitals was a relatively foreign concept. In the first place, capital
access was considerably more limited than it is today, and the limited
access to capital provided a significant barrier to entry to new com-
petitors in most marketplaces. Second, health planning laws that were
enacted on a national basis in the early 1970s provided further re-
straints on the development of robust competition in all marketplaces
throughout the United States. As a consequence, facility expansion
and technical advances within the health care industry were effec-
tively rationed.
The late 1960s was also a time period when nonprofit organiza-
tions were the dominant providers of acute care hospital services,
long-term care and what we refer to today as "managed care." In fact,
most proprietary hospitals were owned by individual physicians or
entrepreneurs. Medicare had been enacted only in 1965, and its in-
centives that drove the consolidation of proprietary hospitals into in-
vestor-owned public companies, such as cost-based reimbursement
and a return on equity for proprietary hospitals, were only being rec-
ognized and exploited toward the late 1960s.
Today, at the beginning of the new millennium, things are, to say
the least, quite different. The continued shift from acute care empha-
sis to outpatient, ambulatory care continues unabated. Each year,
increasing numbers of surgical and other procedures are being shifted
from the inpatient setting to the outpatient setting, and even dis-
charges from complex inpatient procedures and surgeries such as open
heart surgery are swifter. In addition, the single corporation, single
hospital mode of doing business has all but disappeared. Multi-
hospital systems predominate and they operate through complex cor-
porate structures. Moreover, those large hospital systems typically
will integrate multiple levels of care within the same system, such as
by establishing skilled nursing facilities.
The pace of technological change continued to accelerate. We
have already witnessed several generations of change in the various
technologies that now support our health care delivery system and
virtually every hospital, managed care organization and other type of
health care delivery or financing system is dependent upon sophisti-
cated information systems. Furthermore, the widespread availability
of health care information that is relatively consumer friendly through
the Internet and other sources has made the health care consumer con-
siderably more well informed than consumers were in 1969. This
2005]
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greater wealth of knowledge, along with greater financial responsibil-
ity, has caused many consumers to become more involved in the de-
termination of the type and quality of care they seek.
Cost-based reimbursement for hospital services is all but gone and
hospitals as well as other health care providers now are compensated
for their services pursuant to fee schedules and deep discounts pre-
dominate in many marketplaces. Medicare and private payors histori-
cally compensated hospitals on the basis of their costs of providing
care, including depreciation and interest expense. Since the enact-
ment of the Prospective Payment System in 1983, payment method-
ologies have increasingly used fee schedules, and discounting by pri-
vate payors now predominates.
Competition in the health care marketplace today is fierce. Mar-
ket factors, such as access to capital, now dictate who can enter most
markets and who will survive, rather than regulation. Traditional full-
service players are now competing with niche players. Publicly-
traded firms such as MedCath now openly compete to develop and
operate specialized heart hospitals with many well-established institu-
tions such as The Cleveland Clinic Foundation. Physicians, tradi-
tional loyalists to the hospitals on whose staffs they had privileges in
the past, are now competitors with those very same hospitals for ser-
vices such as ambulatory surgery and nuclear medicine.
Finally, nonprofit organizations have lost their dominant positions
in long-term care and managed care. In 2005, when this article is
being published, both the long-term care and managed care industries
will be dominated by investor-owned companies whose stock is
traded on national stock exchanges rather than by the freestanding
nonprofit organizations that had historically owned and operated the
nation's long term-care facilities and its health maintenance organiza-
tions.
Against this backdrop, the IRS through its rulings positions and
its litigating positions has, subtly, been reversing the legal advances it
had pioneered with the publication of Revenue Ruling 69-545 and
begun regressing towards the relief of poverty theory of exemption
that it formally promulgated in Revenue Ruling 56-185.6 Similarly,
litigation has seldom been a good place for the development of sound
health care policy, but that is precisely what has occurred in decisions
such as IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner,7 Redlands Surgical
Services v. Commissioner8 and St. David's Health Care System v.
6 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203 (stating the grounds for a hospi-
tal's exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Code).
7 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
8 113 T.C. 47, 93-94 (1999), affdper curiam, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
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United States.9 In IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit all but eliminated the ability of non-
staff model and non-dedicated group model HMOs to obtain tax-
exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. Redlands Surgical Ser-
vices v. Commissioner and St. David's Health Care System v. United
States have superimposed a new "control" test on joint ventures be-
tween nonprofit health care providers and individuals or proprietary
firms. Thus, the thesis of this article is how the development of fed-
eral tax exemption standards has shaped health care policy and meth-
ods of delivery.
II. TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS
Since the enactment of the first federal tax laws, nonprofit hospi-
tals have been entitled to tax exemption if they were organized and
operated exclusively for charitable or other exempt purposes. Despite
this heritage, the criteria for determining whether a nonprofit hospital
is entitled to obtain or maintain its tax-exempt status were not formal-
ized until the publication in 1956 of Revenue Ruling 56-185.
In 1969, Revenue Ruling 69-545 was published, modifying Reve-
nue Ruling 56-185.10 Subsequently, Revenue Ruling 83-157 further
modified the exemption criteria set forth in Revenue Ruling 69-545.11
Revenue Ruling 56-185 set forth the affirmative organizational
and operational requirements a hospital had to meet in order to qualify
for or remain eligible for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3). First,
Revenue Ruling 56-185 established an organizational test for hospi-
tals, even though none was expressly required at that time by statute
or regulation.1 2 Reflecting the approach taken by the courts, Revenue
Ruling 56-185 expressly prohibited the payment of dividends and
generally reiterated the view of the courts that the organizational test
could be satisfied by the actions of for profit corporations rather than
only by legally enforceable limits on the payments of dividends or the
transfers of stock for value. 13 In fact, Revenue Ruling 56-185 said:
9 349 F.3d 232, 233 (5th Cir. 2003), vacating and remanding 90 A.F.T.R.2d
(RIA) 6878 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
10 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
" Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
12 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203 ("It must be organized as a non-
profit charitable organization for the purpose of operating a hospital for the care of the
sick.").
13 Id.
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[e]xemption will not be defeated . ..merely because the
shareholders or members might possibly at some future date
share in the assets upon dissolution in the absence of a case of
mala fides where there appears to be a plan on the part of the
shareholder or individual to acquire assets on the dissolution
of the corporation. 
14
Second, Revenue Ruling 56-185 required that to obtain or main-
tain its tax-exempt status, a nonprofit hospital "must be operated to
the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the ser-
vices rendered and not exclusively for those who are able and ex-
pected to pay."'15 The focus of Revenue Ruling 56-185 on the relief of
poverty theory of exemption was consistent with the then applicable
definition of "charitable" contained in the pre-1959 Treasury Regula-
tions.'
6
Revenue Ruling 56-185 also prescribed the other criteria that IRS
would use to determine the eligibility of nonprofit hospitals for tax-
exempt status. These criteria included medical staff composition,
calculation of the level or free or below cost care provided, the hospi-
tal's charity record, and the propriety of charging for services ren-
dered.
17
In 1959 the § 501(c)(3) regulations were amended comprehen-
sively. They now provide that:
[t]he term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in its gen-
erally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be con-
strued as limited by the separate enumeration in section
501 (c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within
the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial deci-
sions. 8
The 1959 revised regulations, which incorporated the long-
established common law concepts of what constitutes a charitable
14 Id. at 203-04.
15 Id. at 203.
16 Treas. Reg. § 39.101(6)-i (1954) ("Corporations organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes comprise, in general, organizations for the relief
of the poor. The fact that a corporation established for the relief of indigent persons
may receive voluntary contributions from the persons intended to be relieved will not
necessarily deprive it of exemption.").
17 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 202-03.
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959), as amended by T.D. 6391, 1959-
2 C.B. 139.
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purpose, paved the way for the publication of Revenue Ruling 69-
545.19
Revenue Ruling 69-545 modified the standards of exemption for
nonprofit hospitals as originally set forth in Revenue Ruling 56-185.
Revenue Ruling 69-545 concluded that the promotion of health is a
charitable purpose deemed beneficial to the community as a whole,
even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct bene-
fit from its activities does not include all members of the commu-
nity.20 The ruling qualified its general statement, however, by adding
that the class benefited by the hospital may not be so small that its
relief fails to be of any benefit to the community.
2
'
The acceptance of the promotion-of-health rationale for the ex-
emption of nonprofit hospitals by the IRS was a late but welcome
recognition of the fact that hospitals in the second half of the twentieth
century were designed and operated to serve all classes of society, and
that they were no longer intended to serve principally as a refuge for
the sick poor. This change of the hospital's specialized function from
that of an almshouse to a modem hospital, and the resultant increased
accessibility of hospital services to entire communities, clearly war-
ranted a change in the criteria used to determine a hospital's entitle-
ment to tax-exempt status. Although enactment of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs in 1965 undoubtedly provided an important impe-
tus to the IRS to embrace the promotion of health as a charitable pur-
pose, the enactment of that legislation could not alone have served as
a reason to change the standards. By 1969, the role of hospitals in
most of the United States had changed dramatically in that most had
developed into community-based resources that generally provided
services to all segments of the communities in which they were lo-
cated.
The publication of Revenue Ruling 69-545 did not resolve all
questions concerning the criteria that should be used to determine
whether a nonprofit hospital is entitled to exemption. Questions were
raised at the time as to whether an emergency room was required or
merely was one of several factors that would be taken into considera-
tion in determining eligibility for § 501(c)(3) exemption. In addition,
specialty and children's hospitals presented different types of ques-
tions, such as whether they even had to have emergency rooms at all
or were required to participate in the Medicare program other than for
end-stage renal disease.
'9 1969-2 C.B. 117.
20 Id. at 117-18.
21 Id.
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In 1983, the IRS published Revenue Ruling 83-157,22 which in-
volved a nonprofit hospital identical to Hospital A of Revenue Ruling
69-545, but without an emergency room. The state health planning
agency had determined that the operation of an emergency room by
the hospital was unnecessary because it would duplicate emergency
services and facilities that were adequately provided by another medi-
cal institution in the community. After discussing the factual devel-
opment of Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS examined other factors
which showed that the hospital was promoting the health of a class of
persons sufficiently broad enough to constitute a charitable class.23
The IRS concluded that, in doing so, the hospital benefited the com-
munity sufficiently to warrant the grant of exemption, notwithstanding
the fact that it did not operate an emergency room. The ruling went
on to note that:
[c]ertain specialized hospitals, such as eye hospitals and can-
cer hospitals, offer medical care limited to special conditions
unlikely to necessitate emergency care and do not, as a practi-
cal matter, maintain emergency rooms. These organizations
may also qualify under section 501(c)(3) if they present simi-
lar, significant factors that demonstrate that the hospitals op-
erate exclusively for the benefit of the community. 4
Revenue Ruling 69-545 modified but did not revoke Revenue
Ruling 56-185. Therefore, hospitals could continue to qualify for
exemption under either the promotion of health rationale or the relief
of poverty rationale. However, the IRS and the courts seem increas-
ingly to focus on requiring some element of free or below cost care as
a condition of exemption.
III. ROLE OF IRS IN SHAPING HEALTH CARE
POLICY
As the discussion of the development of the standards for exemp-
tion in Revenue Ruling 56-185 and Revenue Ruling 69-545 in the
preceding section indicates, the IRS generally has been reactive to
health care policy changes and changes in the methods of delivery of
health care services. Until the late 1800s, hospitals were generally
considered to be almshouses and in many cases were actually hazard-
ous to a patient's health. With advances in surgical techniques, anes-
thesiology and asepsis, hospitals emerged in the late nineteenth cen-
22 1983-2 C.B. 94.
23 Id. at 95.
24 id.
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tury as places where high quality, safe care could be obtained by all
members of the communities they served. Similarly, the IRS was
reactive in 1969 to modes of change in reimbursement for health care
services by its recognition that hospitals could evidence that they
served the communities to a sufficient degree by participating in a
Medicare program and, later in 1983, adding the Medicaid program.
Today, however, through its rulings positions and its litigating po-
sitions, the IRS has intentionally been trying to reshape the standards
it promulgated in Revenue Ruling 69-545 without actually amending
or revoking that revenue ruling.
A. Example One: Medical Staff Membership
Early in the development of the modem hospital, physicians rec-
ognized that medical staff membership was important to their profes-
sional and economic success. In a large urban teaching hospital,
medical staff membership might result in increased professional
status, increased opportunities for referrals, and access to the most
sophisticated medical technology. In the small suburban or rural hos-
pital, medical staff membership might mean increased opportunities
for generation of fee income and independence of professional judg-
ment.
The IRS recognized the importance of medical staff membership
to exemption in Revenue Rulings 56-185 and 69-545. In Revenue
Ruling 56-185, the IRS stated that the hospital "must not restrict the
use of its facilities to a particular group of physicians and surgeons,
such as a medical partnership or association, to the exclusion of all
other qualified doctors. ''25 The IRS held that such a limitation was
"inconsistent with the public service concept inherent in section
501 (c)(3) and the prohibition against the inurement of benefits to pri-
vate shareholders or individuals. 26 Nonetheless, Revenue Ruling 56-
185 recognized that there must be "some discretionary authority in the
management to approve the qualifications of those [physicians] apply-
ing for the use of the medical facilities. 27 The revenue ruling added
that "[t]he size and nature of facilities may also make it necessary to
impose limitations on the extent to which [the facilities] may be made
available to all reputable and competent physicians in the area.
28
Revenue Ruling 69-54529 dealt with the medical staff issue by us-
ing two examples. Hospital A, a 250-bed hospital, had 150 doctors on
25 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203.
26 id.
27 Id.
28 id.
29 1969-2 C.B. 117.
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its active staff and 200 on its courtesy staff. Hospital B, by contrast,
had an extremely small medical staff. In fact, the five physicians who
originally owned the hospital composed the hospital's medical com-
mittee and thereby controlled the selection and admission of other
physicians to the medical staff. While other physicians were granted
medical staff privileges, patients of the five original physicians ac-
counted for a large majority of all hospital admissions over the years.
The IRS found Hospital A to be tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3) because
no private interest was being served; however, the IRS concluded that
Hospital B did not qualify for tax exemption because the "facts indi-
cate that the hospital is operated for the private benefit of its original
owners, rather than for the exclusive benefit of the public."
30
Neither revenue ruling established any definitive criteria for
medical staff membership that a nonprofit hospital must have in order
to qualify for or retain its exempt status. However, the absence of any
specific requirements did not prevent the IRS from arguing in Hard-
ing Hospital, Inc. v. United States31 that a hospital had to have an
open medical staff in order to qualify for exemption. In Harding, the
hospital ultimately lost its tax-exempt status on other grounds.
32
However, the court rejected the IRS's assertion that a closed medical
staff comprised of physicians with a particular psychiatric specialty
was per se inimical to exemption, stating that:
we know of no authority for the legal argument that because a
hospital is needed by doctors to practice their specialty the
hospital cannot claim a tax exemption. Acceptance of such a
proposition might eliminate tax exemptions for a substantial
number of hospitals in that nearly all medical specialists re-
quire a hospital in which to practice, e.g., surgeons and heart
transplant specialists require highly specialized hospital facili-
ties.
Equally misfounded is the Government's contention that
we should penalize the Hospital with loss of its tax exemption
because the Associates' milieu therapy type of treatment acts
as a de facto limitation on the staff of the Hospital.... To
adopt such proposition might effectively read out of the law
the ability of any specialized hospital, e.g., milieu therapy
psychiatric institution, cancer research hospital, skin treatment
clinic, to acquire tax exempt status. To our knowledge, nei-
ther Congress nor the Commissioner, has ever manifested
30 Id. at 118.
31 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
32 Id. at 1075.
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such an intent, and it is not mandated by the third requirement
of Rev. Rul. 56-185. 33
As can be seen from the foregoing rebuke of the IRS, the Sixth
Circuit rejected the notion that an open medical staff is a required
characteristic of a hospital in order for it to have its tax-exempt status
recognized under § 501(c)(3). Indeed, that conclusion would be sup-
ported by a plain reading of the Revenue Ruling 56-185 statement that
"the size of and nature of facilities may make it necessary to infuse
limitations on the extent to which they may be made charitable to all
reputable and competent physicians in the area." 34 However, because
it advanced its litigating position, the IRS nevertheless made the ar-
gument.
B. Example Two: Board Composition
The board of directors of a nonprofit hospital plays a critical role
in its operations because, in most instances, the board is ultimately
responsible for the hospital's finances and operations.
Despite the importance of the board of directors' role, the IRS has
never clearly articulated any requirements regarding board selection
and composition. For example, Revenue Ruling 56-185 made no
mention of the board of directors' relevance to the determination of
whether a hospital is entitled to exemption.35 However, in Revenue
Ruling 69-545, the IRS compared one hospital that qualified for ex-
emption with one that did not; the hospital that qualified for exemp-
tion was governed by a board composed of "prominent citizens" of
the community, while the board that failed to qualify for exemption
consisted of seven persons, the five physicians who originally owned
the hospital, their accountant, and their lawyer.36 Subsequently, in
Revenue Ruling 83-157, the IRS observed that a "significant" factor
evidencing that a nonprofit hospital promotes the health of a suffi-
ciently broad class of persons to benefit the community was the pres-
ence of "a board of directors drawn from the community. 37 How-
ever, even the latter revenue ruling provided no further guidance con-
cerning the relevance of such a board or its composition to charitable
exemption.
It is fairly clear that the composition and functions of a hospital's
board of directors are relevant to tax exemption in at least two re-
33 Id. at 1076-77 (citations omitted).
14 Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
35 id.
36 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
37 Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 95.
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spects. First, the composition of the board can provide important cir-
cumstantial evidence that the hospital serves public rather than private
purposes. For example, it is fair to presume that a board of directors
chosen from the community would place the interests of the commu-
nity above those of either the management or the medical staff of the
hospital. Conversely, significant physician membership on a board
raises a legitimate concern that such a board might not always put
community interests above physician interests, particularly in transac-
tions involving physicians, such as physician recruitment or joint ven-
ture transactions. Such a board is not incapable of pursuing commu-
nity interests, but it might bear a heavier burden of proving that its
processes for reviewing and approving transactions through which
private persons could benefit are well-designed to ensure that the
transactions are, in fact, fair.
Second, the composition of the board becomes relevant when a
question is raised concerning whether a program, an expenditure, or
an activity of the hospital has resulted in the inurement of net earnings
to the benefit of a private shareholder or individual. For example,
approval of a management compensation program, a physician re-
cruitment program, or expenditure of hospital resources by a board of
directors should be supported by evidence that the program or expen-
diture was undertaken after arm's length consideration and in the best
interest of the hospital, and that it was not intended to provide unwar-
ranted benefits to the program's or expenditure's direct beneficiaries.
Despite the fact that Revenue Ruling 69-545, as modified by
Revenue Ruling 83-157, does not mandate the use of a community
representative board, the IRS has often treated the presence of a com-
munity representative board as a requirement rather than merely as
evidence of community benefit. For example, in IHC Health Plans,
Inc. v. Commissioner, the IRS successfully raised the question in the
Tax Court proceedings concerning the composition of the Board of
Directors of IHC Health Plans, Inc. notwithstanding the absence of
any facts in the records suggesting that the Board, however com-
prised, acted inappropriately in any single instance.38 Similarly, in the
38 IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 246, 246, 249-
50 (2001):
(Pletitioner's bylaws stated that its board of trustees would be composed of
a plurality of a plurality of representatives from the buyer-employer com-
munity, with an approximately equal number of physicians and hospital
representatives. The composition of petitioner's board of trustees, lacking
in representation of the community at large, furthers the inference that peti-
tioner predominately served the private interests of the larger employers
participating in its plans. In the absence of an explanation in the record, the
[Vol. 15:5
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mid-1990s, as the IRS was seeing increasing numbers of exemption
applications for integrated delivery systems, the IRS first mandated a
board composition requirement that at least fifty-one percent of the
board be comprised of independent directors, and the increased that to
at least eighty percent in some instances. 39 Furthermore, even though
the actual adoption of formal conflict of interest policies is not a stated
requirement anywhere, the IRS is effectively imposing a requirement
that boards adopt conflict of interest policies when it considers ex-
emption applications or ruling requests.40
In short, the composition of a board of directors of a nonprofit
hospital, or other type of § 501(c)(3) organization, has been changed
from merely being a factor evidencing the existence of community
benefit to a mandatory requirement in many cases.
C. Example 3: Charity Care
The relationship of charity care to exemption under § 501(c)(3) is
one that requires careful scrutiny. Many commentators, especially
those that advocate a "donative" theory of exemption, suggest that
some meaningful level of charity care should be a precondition of
exemption. However, as is often the case with such broad-based
propositions, the real world circumstances surrounding many health
care organizations and the environments in which they operate argue
for a markedly different, more nuanced conclusion.
In several recent cases, and then in a Field Service Advice Memo-
randum issued by the IRS in 2001, the IRS and the courts have
seemed to elevate the importance of providing charity care in order to
qualify for exemption under the promotion-of-health rationale. For
example, in Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner,41 the Tax
Court upheld the denial of an exemption sought by an organization
involved in a partnership formed to acquire and operate a free-
standing ambulatory surgery center. The Tax Court rejected the peti-
tioner's argument that its low level of Medicaid care should not serve
as part of the basis for denying exemption:
Court is left with doubt as to petitioner's provision of a community benefit.
Petitioner has the burden of proof.
39 See Charles F. Kaiser & John F. Reilly, Integrated Delivery Systems, in
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 1994 (1994) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicn94.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
40 In fact, the new Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption
Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, has several questions concern-
ing conflicts of interest policies. I.R.S. Form 1023 (Oct. 2004) available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf.
41 113 T.C. 47, 47-48 (1999), aff'dper curiam, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
2005]
HEALTH MATRIX
[t]he facts remain that the Surgery Center provides no free
care to indigents and only negligible coverage for [Medicaid]
patients. That low-income individuals may not typically seek
the types of services the Surgery Center offers may partially
explain the virtual absence of relief it provides for such indi-
viduals. But it provides no independent basis for establishing
practitioner's charitable purposes in its involvement with the
Surgery Center. Moreover, the activities of Redlands Hospi-
tal in effecting some negligible degree of [Medicaid] coverage
at the Surgery Center and in increasing the number of man-
aged care contracts do not provide a basis for establishing pe-
42titioner's exemption.
Similarly, in three decisions43 involving HMOs, the Tax Court
upheld the IRS' denials of exemption because, among other things the
organizations were not providing charity care. In IHC Health Plans v.
Commissioner, the court noted that "[pletitioner did not institute any
program whereby individuals were permitted to become members
while paying reduced premiums. Aside from the free health screen-
ings [that petitioner conducted in 1999] ... , petitioner did not provide
or arrange to provide any free or low cost health care services."" In a
related case, the court observed that because the HMO had no medical
facility of its own and did not employ physicians, petitioner "could
not provide free medical care to those otherwise unable to pay for
medical services. ' ' 5 Additionally, "petitioner did not establish a sub-
sidized premiums program, conduct research, or offer free education
programs to the public.
' 6
These three Tax Court memorandum decisions were consolidated
on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 47 The
court of appeals concluded that "a health-care provider must make its
services available to all in the community plus provide additional
community or public benefits."4 The court of appeals clearly implied
that the provision of free or low cost products or services would be
42 Id. at 87.
43 IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 593 (2001),
IHC Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 606 (2001), and IHC Care, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 617 (2001).
44 IHC Care, Inc., 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 601.
41 IHC Group, Inc., 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 615.
46 id
47 IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
48 Id. at 1198.
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one type of "plus" that would provide evidence of community bene-
fit.
49
Finally, nonprecedential guidance from the IRS could also be in-
terpreted as enhancing the importance of "charity care" in this analy-
sis. In early 2001, the IRS released Field Service Advice Memoran-
dum 200110030, which concludes as follows:
[a] hospital's stated policies to provide health care services to
the indigent are not sufficient to satisfy the charity care re-
quirement of the community benefit standard under the opera-
tional test in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), unless the hospi-
tal demonstrates that such policies actually result in the deliv-
ery of significant health care services to the indigent.5°
The field service advice memorandum then identified fourteen
questions that should be used by agents in the course of an audit to
determine whether the free care policy of the hospital actually resulted
in the delivery of significant health care services to the indigent.
51
Shortly after this field service advice memorandum was released, IRS
personnel in various speeches tended to dismiss the field service ad-
vice memorandum as not precendential and not subject to high level
of review, thereby attempting to distance themselves from the legal
position described therein.52 However, the language found in the field
service advice memorandum suggested that at least at some levels of
the IRS there remains a view that charity care is not only relevant to
the presence or absence of community benefit but also a required ele-
ment of it.
As these various authorities suggest, a record of charity care can
serve as evidence of community benefit. It is, however, highly ques-
tionable whether a record of charity care should be relevant to the
question of whether private interests are being served more than inci-
dentally, which is the proper legal standard under the promotion of
health rationale for exemption. Indeed, in suggesting that a record of
charity care is a requirement of the community benefits standards, the
field service advice memorandum appears to diverge sharply from the
IRS's long-standing published position. Notwithstanding the intima-
49 Id. at 1200.
50 Internal Revenue Service, Field Service Advice, FSA 200110030 at 2
(Feb. 5, 2001).
"1 Id. at 5-6.
52 See Fred Stokeld, IRS Branch Chief Clarifies Guidance on Hospitals Joint
Ventures, 33 EXEMPT. ORG. TAX REv. 203 (2001); see also Carolyn D. Wright, Offi-
cials Discuss FSAs, Business Plan, Simplification with EO, Bond Practitioners at
ABA Meeting, 32 EXEMPT. ORG. TAX REv. 401 (2001).
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tions of the field service advice memorandum and any broad state-
ments in court decisions, there are a number of reasons why a record
of charity care should not of itself be a precondition to exemption
under the promotion of health rationale; rather, the record of charity
care should be considered in the context of the specific organization.
First, Revenue Ruling 56-185 recognized that a grant of §
501 (c)(3) exemption to a hospital under a relief-of-poverty exemption
or theory of exemption required only that the hospital provide free or
below-cost care to the extent of its financial ability.5 3 Thus, those
organizations with no or little financial ability to provide free or be-
low-cost care should be relieved of this requirement.
Second, in an era of multi-corporate health care systems, the
evaluation of charity care records should be examined. on a system-
wide basis, rather than on the single entity-by-entity basis. Thus, to
the extent that other corporate members within an organization's sys-
tem provide substantial levels of free or below-cost care, that organi-
zation should not have to demonstrate a record of charity care as a
prerequisite to exemption.
Third, the importance of a charity care policy to a particular or-
ganization's exemption should depend on the nature of the services
provided by the organization. Revenue Ruling 69-545 clearly was not
intended to require a nonprofit hospital to provide all services to all
persons. If it were read that way, literally thousands of hospitals
would face the loss of their exemption. Rather, unlike the view em-
braced by the Tax Court in Redlands Surgical Services v. Commis-
sioner,54 the nature of the services provided by an organization,
whether it be a hospital or another type of health care organization,
should be taken into consideration in determining whether the pres-
ence or absence of a high level of charity care is relevant to the deter-
mination of whether the organization is entitled to exemption under §
501 (c)(3).
Finally, the role of charity care must be considered in the context
of other factors, such as the presence or absence of a governmental
hospital that is expressly funded to provide care to the indigent, or the
presence or absence of federal or state governmental regulations af-
fecting the decisions being made by indigent persons as to where to
obtain care.
" Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, 203.
14 113 T.C. 47, 92-93 (1999), affdper curiam, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
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IV. MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
When prepaid health plans such as HMOs were first established
during the 1920s and 1930s, there was little guidance on standards for
determining whether these organizations qualified for exemption.
Instead, parallels were drawn between the prepaid health plans and the
hospital and medical service organizations (i.e., Blue Cross and Blue
Shield organizations) that also were being developed at the time. Be-
cause Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations were classified for
tax-exempt status as social welfare organizations under the predeces-
sor to § 501(c)(4), the IRS administratively classified prepaid health
plans in the same fashion, allowing them to qualify for tax-exempt
status as § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations.5 Despite the fact
that the IRS preferred to classify prepaid health plans as § 501(c)(4)
organizations, and many plans qualified for tax-exempt status under
that section, a few organizations were in fact recognized as exempt
under § 501(c)(3) during the early 1970s.
When the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 197356 was
enacted, funding through loans and grant programs was provided to
nonprofit HMOs that qualified for § 501(c)(3) exemption as a means
of stimulating their formation and growth. The existence of the this
funding, along with the statutory requirements concerning eligibility,
stimulated interest on the part of HMO sponsors to obtain § 501(c)(3)
exemption rather than just § 501(c)(4) exemption. Also, as certain
staff and group model HMOs grew, their facilities development in-
creased and was in fact stimulated by exemptions from state certifi-
cate of need laws designed to stimulate the growth of HMOs. Thus, §
501(c)(3) exemption became more desirable than § 501(c)(4) exemp-
tion because it would enable such HMOs to gain access to the tax-
exempt bond market to finance the construction and equipping of such
facilities.
Notwithstanding a clear public policy rationale for encouraging
the growth of HMOs, and the clear Congressional expression of a
preference for HMOs that are described in § 501(c)(3), the IRS re-
mains resistant to granting exemption under § 501(c)(3) to HMOs
and, although initially unsuccessful, the IRS has continued to object to
granting § 501(c)(3) exemption to most HMOs other than staff model
and dedicated-group model HMOs.
55 See, e.g., James J. McGovern, Federal Tax Exemption of Prepaid Health
Care Plans, 7 TAx ADVISOR 76 (1976). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9201039 (July 24,
1991), which discusses the administrative development of the IRS's position concern-
ing the exempt status of Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations.
56 Health Maintenance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 42 U.S.C. § 300e
(2000).
2005]
HEALTH MATRIX
Sound Health Association v. Commissioner57 was the first liti-
gated case in which the promotion-of-health rationale was used to
determine whether an HMO qualified for exemption under §
501(c)(3). In some respects, Sound Health Association, because it
was a "staff' model HMO and owned certain of its medical facilities,
was a good candidate for establishing precedent for granting §
501(c)(3) exemption to HMOs. However, its unique facts and pro-
posed methods of operation made the Tax Court decision highly fact-
specific, which has resulted in controversy and confusion concerning
the appropriate operational characteristics an HMO must have if it
wishes to obtain § 501(c)(3) exemption.
The Tax Court observed that while the operation of an HMO is
not specifically listed as a qualifying exempt activity within the mean-
ing of § 501(c)(3), an HMO could qualify for § 501(c)(3) status if it
were operated in furtherance of a charitable purpose. 58 It concluded
that "the tests applied to determine the status of a hospital are relevant
to a determination on the status of an HMO. Clearly, both types of
organizations must qualify as charitable under section 501(c)(3) on
the basis of the health care services that they provide."
59
The opinion then focused on the basic question of whether Sound
Health Association was organized and operated for charitable pur-
poses because it promoted health for the benefit of the community.6 °
In describing the community benefit approach, the court noted that
"[a] charity will benefit the community if the class served is not so
small that its relief is not of benefit to the community.' It added that
"[t]he requirement that the community must benefit from a charity's
activities has, as its natural corollary, that private interests must not so
benefit in any substantial degree.,
62
After discussing the organizational test and concluding that the
HMO readily passed it, the Tax Court focused its attention on the op-
erations of the HMO to determine whether those operations evidenced
that a charitable or exempt purpose was being served by the organiza-
tion. The Tax Court observed that Sound Health Association had sev-
eral characteristics similar to Hospital A described in Revenue Ruling
69-545 that helped demonstrate that it was operated for charitable
purposes. The characteristics identified by the Tax Court were as
follows:
7 71 T.C. 158 (1978).
58 Id. at 177.
'9 Id. at 178-79.
60 Id. at 181.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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1. The HMO had established programs and facilities
similar to those of a hospital, including opening its
clinics to emergency patients whether or not they
were financially able to pay, and whether or not they
were members.
2. The HMO established the research program to help
study better ways of delivering health care services.
3. The HMO established an education program.
4. The HMO adopted a plan to establish a fund to re-
ceive contributions that would be used to subsidize
persons who wanted a membership but who could not
make the full monthly payments required for mem-
bership. The Tax Court expressly noted that this ac-
tion was "more charitable than any undertaken by
Hospital A."
5. The HMO maintained a courtesy staff that was open
to all qualified physicians; no physician had been
turned down for admission to the courtesy staff as of
the time the exemption application had been filed.
6. The Board of Directors of the HMO was made up of
prominent citizens of the community, although the
board was elected from among the HMO's mem-
bers.63
The Tax Court's focus on these various operational characteristics
was not intended to prescribe a definitive set of requirements that an
HMO had to meet in order to qualify for § 501(c)(3) exemption.
However, from almost the very outset, the IRS attempted to use the
operational factors recited by the Tax Court as a list of requirements
that must be met for an HMO to qualify for exemption.64
As noted, the IRS has sought to limit the application of the Tax
Court's decision in Sound Health Association v. Commissioner to
those prepaid health plans and HMOs that have all of the characteris-
tics of the health plan operated by Sound Health Association. If that
view were adopted, only HMOs that, at a minimum, employed physi-
cians and owned their own clinics, would be entitled to § 501(c)(3)
exemption. The IRS continues to take the position that to qualify for
§ 501 (c)(3) exemption, an HMO must do something more than simply
operate an HMO that is accessible to a broad cross-section of the
63 Id. at 184-85.
64 See Gen. Couns. Mer. 38,735 (May 29, 1981).
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community, including individuals, small employers and persons eligi-
ble for managed care coverage under a governmental program such as
Medicare or Medicaid. In IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner,
65
the IRS was successful in convincing the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit to embrace a restrictive definition of the promotion of
health, at least as it applies to HMOs.
The court began its analysis of whether the IHC HMOs were enti-
tled to § 501(c)(3) exemption by observing that "[i]n defining 'chari-
table,' our analysis must focus on whether petitioners' activities con-
ferred a public benefit.... The public-benefit requirement highlights
the quid pro quo nature of tax exemptions: the public is willing to
relieve an organization from the burden of taxation in exchange for
the public benefit it provides. 66 After reviewing Revenue Rulings
69-545 and 83-157, the court concluded that "we must determine
whether the taxpayer operates primarily for the benefit of the commu-
nity. And while the concept of 'community benefit' is somewhat
amorphous, we agree with the IRS, the Tax Court, and the Third Cir-
cuit that it provides a workable standard for determining tax exemp-
tion under section 501 (c)(3). 67
The court then made a number of points in creating a definition of
community benefit. First, it stated that "engaging in an activity that
promotes health, standing alone, offers an insufficient indicium of an
organization's purpose. Numerous for-profit enterprises offer prod-
ucts or services that promote health. 68
It then cited Revenue Rulings 69-545 and 83-157 for the proposi-
tion that
an organization cannot satisfy the community-benefit re-
quirement based solely on the fact that it offers health-care
services to all in the community in exchange for a fee. Al-
though providing health-care products or services to all in the
community is necessary under those rulings, it is insufficient,
standing alone, to qualify for tax exemption under section
501(c)(3). Rather, the organization must provide some addi-
tional 'plus'.
69
It then discussed the need for quantifying the required community
benefit and observed that difficulties will inevitably arise in attempt-
ing to do so.
65 325 F.3d 1188, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003).
66 Id. at 1195.
67 Id. at 1197.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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The Tenth Circuit, then proffered a brand new community benefit
test couched as a "plus" test, which it described as follows:
under section 501(c)(3), a health-care provider must make its
services available to all in the community plus provide addi-
tional community or public benefits. The benefit must either
further the function of government-funded institutions or pro-
vide a service that would not likely be provided within the
community but for the subsidy. Further, the additional public
benefit conferred must be sufficient to give rise to a strong in-
ference that the public benefit is the primary purpose for
which the organization operates. In conducting this inquiry,
we consider the totality of the circumstances.7 0
Having created a completely new test of exemption, the Tenth
Circuit then went on to apply the test to the three IHC HMOs and
concluded that none of the three HMOs operated primarily for the
benefit of the community within the meaning of its test.
71
The Tenth Circuit's opinion began by analyzing the nature of the
product or service and the character of the transaction involved and
observed that the HMOs did not provide health care services directly.
It then observed that "[t]he fact that an activity is normally undertaken
by commercial for-profit entities does not necessarily preclude tax
exemption, particularly where the entity offers its services at or be-
lowcost.
72
Because none of the HMOs provided free or below cost services,
the court concluded that the HMOs' sole activity of arranging for
health care services in exchange for a fee argued against granting
charitable exemption to the organizations.73 The court also noted that
the absence of research or educational programs bolstered its conclu-
sion that the HMOs did not operate for the purpose of promoting
health for the benefit of the community.74
The court also looked at other factors such as the membership re-
quirement and the composition of their boards of trustees and used
negative inferences drawn from both of those characteristics to sup-
port its ultimate conclusion that the HMOs, standing alone, do not
qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3). 75
70 Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 325 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir.
2003).
71 Id. at 1198-1201.
72 Id. at 1200.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1200-01.
71 Id. at 1201-02.
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From the standpoint of an HMO, § 501 (c)(3) exemption is prefer-
able to § 501(c)(4). By supporting § 501(c)(3) exemption only for
HMOs are organized around the staff model or dedicated group
model, while at the same time denying § 501(c)(3) status to other
types of HMOs, the IRS rulings and litigating positions are effectively
shaping health care policy by providing incentives for selected modes
of HMO organization and operational characteristics. It is fairly clear
today that the benefits of HMO membership are less dependent on the
model than they were in 1973. All emphasize preventive care and
disease management and even traditional "staff' model HMOs have
morphed into mixed models.
V. CONCLUSION
For more than thirty-five years, the IRS and the courts have dis-
tinguished between the legal definition of the charitable purpose "re-
lief of poor and the distressed," and the legal definition of the charita-
ble purpose "promotion of health for the benefit of the community."
The role of charity care in relation to exemption of organizations
formed to relieve the poor and the distressed is self-evident, because
that is the very basis upon which exemption is granted. However, the
role of charity care under the promotion of health for the benefit of the
community rationale is less clear.
In 1969, the IRS effectively acknowledged that it was publishing
Revenue Ruling 69-545 in response to changing conditions in the
health care field and argued this position as it aggressively defended
the propriety of Revenue Ruling 69-545.76 In more recent years, how-
ever, the IRS has advocated a more subtle position. Through its ruling
positions as well as in litigation, the IRS is effectively requiring health
care organizations to do more than conduct the basic functions they
were formed to undertake. Instead, as is evidenced by the Tenth Cir-
cuit opinion in IHC Health Plans, Inc. the Commissioner, something
more is required, such as the provision of charity care, the provision
of educational programs or the conduct of medical research. It is
fairly clear that this is a requirement beyond that called for by Reve-
76 See E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The court stated that
[i]f these procedural protections [i.e. the medical needs of the poor] had
been provided, doubtless it would have been disclosed that millions of
Americans are indeed too poor to pay for hospital services and have no
means of obtaining those services except as charity patients at our nonprofit
hospitals. With this fact established as a matter of record, I confidently be-
lieve that Revenue Ruling 69-545 would never have been promulgated in
the first place.
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nue Ruling 69-545 and the promotion of health for the benefit of the
community rationale as expressed in that revenue ruling. The issue of
how much charity care, as well as board and medical staff composi-
tion, involve specific operational characteristics that should not be
dictated by tax law - they should reflect the then-current health care
policies of persons charged with establishing health care, not tax pol-
icy. For this reason, it would be good "tax" policy for the IRS to reaf-
firm its more flexible "facts and circumstances" approach embraced in
Revenue Ruling 69-545 and eschew its current prescriptive approach.

